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Abstract
This paper examines the joint role of the elasticity of taxable income (the
eﬀect on taxable income of a tax rise) and the revenue elasticity (the eﬀect on
revenue of a change in taxable income) in inﬂuencing the revenue eﬀects of tax
rate changes. Traditionally, the revenue elasticity has been the central concept
in examining ﬁscal drag, or obtaining local measures of tax progressivity. But it
has an additional role in the context of the revenue eﬀects of tax changes when
incomes respond to rate changes. The elasticity of tax revenue with respect
to a rate change is examined at both the individual and aggregate level. If
there were no incentive eﬀects, an equal proportional change in all marginal
tax rates would produce the same proportional increase in total revenue — the
elasticity is unity. This rapidly falls, at a linear rate, as the elasticity of taxable
income increases. Illustrations are provided using the New Zealand income tax
structures before and after the 2010 Budget, which reduced all rates while leaving
income thresholds unchanged and, in particular, reduced the top marginal rate
substantially.
∗The authors are, respectively, the Truby Williams Professor of Economics at Melbourne University,
and Chief Economist, the New Zealand Treasury. The views, opinions, ﬁndings, and conclusions or
recommendations expressed in this paper are strictly those of the authors. They do not necessarily
reﬂect the views of the New Zealand Treasury. We are grateful to the New Zealand Royal Society,
through their Cross Departmental Research Pool scheme, for supporting this research.
11 Introduction
In the analysis of income tax structures, two elasticities play an important role at
individual and aggregate levels. First, the tax revenue elasticity — the elasticity of tax
revenue with respect to a change in gross income — is the central concept in the literature
on ‘ﬁscal drag’, which is concerned with the extent to which the non-indexation of tax
thresholds leads to increasing average tax rates over time.1 In this context, the change
in gross income is considered to be exogenous and any consequent feedback disincentive
eﬀect on income arising from the change in the average tax rate is ignored. Indeed,
at the individual level the literature concentrates on changes which do not involve
a movement across tax thresholds, which would otherwise lead to a change in the
marginal tax rate.2
Second, the elasticity of taxable income — the elasticity of taxable income with
respect to a change in the marginal net-of-tax rate (one minus the marginal rate) —
captures the net eﬀect of all incentive eﬀects associated with the marginal rate change.
This approach to grouping all the various responses, such as labour supply, income
shifting, under-reporting of income and so on, in a reduced-form speciﬁcation has
attracted much attention.3 It avoids the considerable complexities of attempting to
combine these eﬀects into a structural model, as well as providing (under certain as-
sumptions) a convenient method of measuring the marginal excess burden arising from
tax changes. The elasticity can be inﬂuenced by policy changes concerning, for exam-
ple, regulations regarding income shifting and the timing of income receipts and tax
payments.
Hence, one elasticity concerns the way tax revenue changes in response to exoge-
nous income changes while the other elasticity measures the extent to which income
declared for tax purposes adjusts when the income tax rate varies.4 The ﬁrst elasticity
1See the survey in Creedy and Gemmell (2002). The revenue elasticity is also used in discussions
of local measures of tax progressivity.
2In simulations generating aggregate elasticities from individual elasticities, care is also needed to
avoid such movements because they can involve huge individual revenue elasticities for tiny changes
in gross income. Labour supply incentive eﬀects, in the context of the revenue elasticity with respect
to wage rate changes, are examined by Creedy and Gemmell (2005).
3The seminal paper is Feldstein (1995). For reviews of evidence see Giertz (2007) and Saez, Slemrod
and Giertz (2009), and for an introduction to the underlying analytics, see Creedy (2009).
4The tax rate may vary as a result of a deliberate policy change, or it may change as individuals
move across income thresholds, particularly as a result of ﬁscal drag. As mentioned earlier, such
2is concerned only with the nature of the income tax structure itself and, when consid-
ering aggregation over individuals, the form of the income distribution. The second
elasticity is concerned with a wide range of behavioural adjustments associated with
tax rate changes, captured in a single measure. Hence there is no direct connection
between the two elasticity concepts. However, there is another associated elasticity in
which the two elasticities have a role. The elasticity of tax revenue with respect to
a change in the marginal tax rate is inﬂuenced, ﬁrst, by the extent to which taxable
income adjusts to the tax rate change and, second, by the way tax revenue adjusts to
the taxable income change.
When discussing revenue changes resulting from marginal rate changes, the existing
literature on the elasticity of taxable income has not generally identiﬁed a separate role
for the revenue elasticity. Changes in total tax obtained from the top marginal rate
in a multi-rate structure are examined in Saez et al. (2009), in the course of deriving
the aggregate excess burden. But they do not consider revenue elasticities. It is shown
below how the revenue elasticity has a clear role at the individual level in inﬂuencing
the change in tax resulting from a rate change. In considering aggregate revenue over
all individuals, changes are shown to depend on the revenue elasticity at the arithmetic
mean income level within each tax bracket in a multi-rate income tax structure.
The aim of this paper is to explore the precise relationships among the three elas-
ticities for the tax functioned mentioned above. Section 2 examines the the individual
tax revenue elasticity, the individual elasticity of taxable income and presents the way
in which the two elasticities combine to determine the elasticity of tax with respect to
a change in the marginal tax rate. The relationships are examined for a completely
general tax function. However, in view of the ubiquitous nature of the multi-step tax
function, and the focus of the previous literature on the ‘top rate’, results are also
given for this special cases. Section 3 looks at aggregation over individuals when a
single marginal rate changes in a multi-rate tax structure. Brief conclusions are in
Section 4.
transitions across thresholds are typically not considered in producing revenue elasticities.
32 Relationships Among Elasticities
This section demonstrates, at the individual level, how the revenue elasticity and the
elasticity of taxable income combine to generate the elasticity of tax with respect
to the marginal rate. Subsections 2.1 and 2.2 are for a general tax function, but
subsection 2.3 explores the special case of the ubiquitous multi-step tax function. In
these sections, the distinction between gross income and taxable income is ignored,
though this distinction is likely to be important for countries with extensive income
tax deductions.5 Subsection 2.4 therefore extends the results to deal with the case
where there are endogenous, income-related deductions.
2.1 The Revenue Elasticity
In the literature on the tax revenue elasticity, concentration is on the eﬀects of changes
in taxation resulting from exogenous changes in taxable income, with the tax rates and
thresholds held constant.6 Let  () denote the tax paid by an individual with income of









This assumes that any deductions and tax thresholds in the tax structure remain un-
changed. The existence of separate deductions, which may depend on , are discussed
below. Using the general notation,  = 














However, it can be seen that the partial elasticity 0
 =1 ,s ot h a t :
 = 
0
 +  (3)
5For discussion of the empirical importance of income-related deductions in personal income tax
regimes in OECD countries, see Caminada and Goudswaard (1996) and Wagstaﬀ and van Doorslaer
(2001). For the US, Feldstein (1999, p. 675) estimated that total income tax deductions in 1993
amounted to about 60% of estimated taxable income.
6The restriction to exogenous income changes is easily controlled in considering individual elasticity
values but of course the nature of the overall distribution of income, which is needed to obtain aggregate
values, may well be inﬂuenced by the incentive eﬀects of the consequent tax changes.
4In obtaining expressions for the revenue elasticity, it is usual in the literature to assume
that the exogenous change in income does not cause the individual to move into a higher
tax bracket. Such a movement, where the tax function involves discrete changes in
marginal rates, gives rise to a large jump in the elasticity, and this can — when carrying
out appropriately tax-share weighted aggregation — distort the aggregate elasticity.
Hence  is considered to be zero, and it may be said that the literature concentrates
on 0
.
It may be tempting here to rewrite  as 1 and think of the latter as reﬂecting
an incentive eﬀect of a change in the marginal tax rate. However, this is not legitimate:
for example the assumption that the individual does not move into a higher tax bracket
when income rises is not consistent with an inﬁnitely large response of income to a
change in the tax rate.
2.2 The Elasticity of Taxable Income
The individual elasticity of taxable income, 1−, measures the behavioural response of
taxable income to a change in the marginal net-of-tax rate, 1−, facing the individual.
This is positive, because increases in the net-of-tax rate are expected to lead to increases







 ,( 4 )
which is negatively signed. Consider a change in the individual’s tax liability resulting












The ﬁrst term may be said to reﬂect a pure ‘tax rate’ eﬀect of a rate change, with
unchanged incomes, while the second term reﬂects the net ‘tax base’ eﬀect resulting
from the incentive eﬀects on taxable income combined with the revenue consequences of
that income change. When discussing the eﬀect on total revenue of a change in the top
income tax rate, Saez et al. (2009) refer to these as the ‘mechanical’ and ‘behavioural’






Furthermore, using (4), along with the fact, mentioned above, that 0










This result links the two relevant elasticities. The total response of tax revenue to a
change in the marginal tax rate is one, minus (1 − ) multiplied by the product of
the revenue elasticity and the elasticity of taxable income. The latter elasticity governs
the way income changes when the marginal tax rate varies, while the ﬁrst elasticity
reﬂect the consequent change in revenue as a result of that income change. If there is
no incentive eﬀect, the total change  is thus equal to the partial change 0
 =1 .













In any progressive income tax structure, the partial elasticity, 0
, exceeds 1, unless
(as shown in the following section) allowances vary suﬃciently with income. Hence
revenue increases only if the absolute value of the elasticity, ,i ss u ﬃciently small.
2.3 The Multi-Step Tax Function
Consider the case of the multi-step tax function, which is deﬁned by a set of income
thresholds, ,f o r =1 , and marginal income tax rates, , applying in tax
brackets, that is between adjacent thresholds  and +1. The funcrion can be written
as:8
 ()=1 ( − 1) 1 ≤ 2
= 1 (2 − 1)+2 ( − 2) 2 ≤ 3
(10)
7Thus, their ‘behavioural eﬀect’ combines the revenue elasticity and elasticity of taxable income
eﬀects. Saez et al. (2009, p. 5) do not discuss the separate role of the revenue elasticity in this context.
Discussion of the rate and base eﬀects is often discussed in the context of a simple proportional tax
structure, with constant average and marginal rate, , where the revenue elasticity is everywhere unity.
Thus if ¯  is arithmetic mean income, 
 =¯  +
¯ 
 and in terms of elasticities,  =1+¯ .
8This is examined in more detail in Creedy and Gemmell (2006).
6and so on. If  falls into the th tax bracket, so that  ≤ +1() can be
written for  ≥ 2 as:
 ()= ( − )+
−1 X
=1
 (+1 − ) (11)
This expression for  () can be rewritten as:











 ( − −1) (13)
and 0 =0 . Thus the tax function facing any individual taxpayer in the th bracket
is equivalent to a tax function with a single marginal tax rate,  applied to income
measured in excess of a single threshold, ∗
. Therefore, unlike , ∗
 diﬀers across
individuals depending on the marginal income tax bracket into which they fall. For














and the individual partial elasticity must exceed unity.
For this tax function, appropriate substitution gives the result that the elasticity of













Suppose that, instead of having only ﬁxed income thresholds, there is a range of deduc-
tions which are income related. In the case of the multi-rate tax schedule discussed in
the previous subsection, the deductions can be integrated into the income thresholds,
, which are then considered to adjust when income varies.
7Consider ﬁrst the revenue elasticity. In this case, again assuming that the individual
does not cross into a higher-rate tax bracket when income increases, it can be shown






where ∗ measures the extent to which the ‘eﬀective threshold’, ∗,v a r i e sw h e n
income changes (a  subscript is suppressed here for convenience). In the case of the



















Next, consider the elasticity of taxable income. With endogenous deductions, a modi-






























Hence, the total eﬀect on revenue as a result of a change in the marginal tax rate is
modiﬁed by the endogenous eﬀect of an income change on the deductions from gross
income. Indeed, to the extent that an increase in the marginal tax rate reduces declared
income, it also reduces the level of deductions claimed, so that the fall in tax revenue
is not as large as it otherwise would be if deductions were ﬁxed.
For the multi-rate schedule, appropriate substitution gives (again neglecting the 















8This can alternatively be expressed in terms of responses of ‘taxable income’,  =

























Hence the elasticity of interest,  can be expressed simply in terms of the marginal
tax rate, , and the responsiveness of taxable income, , to the net-of-tax rate, 1−.
3 Aggregate Revenue
For tax policy purposes attention is often devoted to aggregate revenue and its variation
as component tax rates are changed. This section therefore examines aggregation over
individuals. Emphasis is on the eﬀect on total income tax revenue of a change in a
single tax rate, and the eﬀect of a simultaneous similar change in all rates. In order to
obtain clear results, attention is restricted to the case of the multi-rate tax function.
It is assumed that all individuals face the same income thresholds, so that endogenous
allowances are not considered here. Aggregate elasticities are derived in subsection 3.1
and, in subsection 3.2, these are compared with an earlier result produced by Saez et al.
(2009). The potential orders of magnitude involved are then examined in subsection
3.3.
When dealing with population aggregates it is necessary to distinguish various tax
a n dr e v e n u et e r m s ,f o rb o t hc l a r i t ya n ds u c cinctness. In the previous section, the
tax liability facing an individual with an income of  has been denoted by  ().I n
the multi-tax form, if  is in the th tax bracket a distinction can be made between
 ()= ( − ∗
) and the tax paid by the individual at the marginal rate, ,t h e r e b y
ignoring tax paid on income falling into lower thresholds.
For aggregate revenue amounts deﬁned over populations, or population sub-groups,
 is used. Thus, in this section  represents aggregate revenue, while  refers to
the aggregate revenue obtained from all individuals whose incomes fall in the th tax
bracket: that is,  is the aggregate over individuals in the th bracket of  ( − ∗
)
9values. Let () denote the aggregate amount raised only at the rate  from individuals
w h of a l li n t ot h eth bracket: that is, () is the sum over individuals in the th bracket
of  ( − ) values. Furthermore, 
+
() refers to the aggregate revenue obtained at
the th rate from individuals whose incomes fall into higher tax brackets: that is, 
+
()
is the number of all individuals in higher tax brackets multiplied by  (+1 − ).
3.1 Changes in Aggregate Revenue
First, it is useful to clarify the general relationship between the elasticity of aggregate
revenue with respect to a single marginal rate change, and the elasticity with respect
to changes in all rates. Suppose all marginal tax rates change, but income thresholds


























Thus the elasticity of aggregate revenue with respect to a simultaneous equal propor-
tional change in all tax rates is the sum of the separate elasticities, 0
,o v e ra l l
 =1 .
In the multi-step tax function with  brackets, suppose  people are in each
bracket, for  =1 , and the arithmetic mean income in each bracket is ¯ .T h e n
aggregate revenue is:
 = 1 (¯ 1 − 1)1
+{2 (¯ 2 − 2)+1 (2 − 1)}2






=+1  denote the number of people above the th tax bracket. For
the top marginal rate, where  = , clearly 
+
 =0 . Thus aggregate revenue can be




 (¯  − ) +
−1 X
=1
 (+1 − )
+
 (26)
Consider next the response of aggregate revenue to a change in the th marginal
tax rate. This has two basic components. First, there is the direct eﬀect of the change
in the th tax rate on tax from that bracket alone. From previous sections above, this
is made up of the behavioural eﬀect of the tax rate change on the incomes of those
in the th bracket, along with the revenue elasticity eﬀect (which is not a reﬂection
of behaviour but depends on the tax structure). Second, there is an indirect eﬀect on
individuals in higher tax brackets, as a result of the term  (+1 − ). Assume ﬁrst















































and the elasticity of total revenue with respect to an equal proportional change in all
rates, in (24), is unity. Any behavioural response clearly reduces the elasticity below
1, as shown below.
In the case where there are behavioural eﬀects of marginal rate changes, it is con-
venient to assume that all those in a given bracket have the same elasticity, .I n
this case, it can be shown that an appropriate adjustment to the average income level


















11The expression in (31), while quite straightforward, does not bring out the separate
elements inﬂuencing 0











































In this expression () + 
+
() 6= .
From equation (14), ¯ (¯  − ∗
) is the revenue elasticity at arithmetic mean in-
come in the th bracket. This expression therefore shows how the elasticity, 0
,
depends on the elasticity of taxable income of those in the th tax bracket, 1−,
along with the revenue elasticity at ¯ , and various tax-share terms. Furthermore, it
can be shown that 0
























For the top bracket, the ﬁn a lt e r mw i t h i ns q u a r eb r a c k e t si ne q u a t i o n( 3 4 )i sz e r oa n d










a n da l t h o u g ht h eﬁrst term in brackets exceeds 1 as long as the tax rate, , is less
than 0.5, the second term in brackets is likely to be well below 1. Hence the elasticity
of taxable income must be relatively low for a tax rate increase to increase aggregate
revenue.
3.2 Comparison with Earlier Results
The above result for any tax rate in a multi-rate structure may be compared with that
given by Saez et al. (2009, p. 5, equation 4) for the top marginal rate. They consider
changes in taxation paid at the top rate only. When converted to the present notation
12and written in elasticity form, their result thus refers not to actual tax paid but to the

















Saez et al. (2009) discuss the term ¯ (¯  − ), which is constant if the income
distribution above the top threshold follows the Pareto form. Their expression therefore
does not indicate the separate role for the revenue elasticity at ¯ . Furthermore, their
‘behavioural response’ actually includes both the behavioural response and the revenue
elasticity eﬀect, which depends on the full tax structure as well as average income above
the top threshold. It is useful to convert (36) into an expression which does separate





















and remembering that ¯ (¯  − ∗
) is the revenue elasticity at ¯ .
From the general result above, the value of 0





















For comparison with (37), it is necessary to use the general relationship between
0
() and 0











Thus multiplication of (38) by () gives the rearranged form of the Saez et al.
result in (37). Hence, as expected, the Saez result is a special case of the more general
result derived above. But instead of focussing on a term such as ¯ (¯  − ),w h i c h
depends purely on the form of the distribution of income, the present formulation
emphasises the joint role of the elasticity of taxable income and the appropriate revenue
elasticity (at the income level, ¯ ), which depends on the nature of the tax function
(the lower rates and thresholds, not simply the top threshold) as well as the income
distribution (which, together with ,a ﬀects ¯ ).
133.3 Illustrative Examples
In order to provide an illustration of potential orders of magnitude, it is useful to
consider the change to the income tax structure in New Zealand, made in the 2010
Budget. For simplicity, the following calculations are made on the assumption that
the distribution of taxable income follows the lognormal distribution with mean and
variance of logarithms of income of 10.0 and 0.7 respectively. These parameter values
imply an arithmetic mean income of $31,257. These assumptions are clearly only
approximate (and in New Zealand the distribution of taxable income has a lower mode
associated with taxable beneﬁts), but serve to indicate the nature of the relationships
involved and the sensitivity to variations in the elasticity of taxable income.
Table 1: The New Zealand Income Tax Structure Before and After the 2010 Budget
   ∗
 ¯     (¯ )
Tax structure pre-2010 Budget
1 0.125 1 1.00 8935.33 0.29 1116.79 0.051 1.000
2 0.210 14000 5667.26 26745.01 0.53 4426.33 0.367 1.269
3 0.330 48000 21060.99 57367.53 0.09 11981.16 0.173 1.580
4 0.380 70000 27500.33 109607.80 0.08 31200.85 0.408 1.335
Tax structure post-2010 Budget
1 0.105 1 1.00 8935.33 0.29 938.10 0.051 1.000
2 0.175 14000 5600.60 26745.01 0.53 3700.27 0.360 1.265
3 0.300 48000 23267.02 57367.53 0.09 10230.15 0.174 1.682
4 0.330 70000 27515.47 109607.80 0.08 27090.48 0.415 1.335
Table 1 provides summary information about the pre- and post-2010 Budget tax
structures, for the assumed income distribution. In the column headed ,  repre-
sents the total number of individuals, so that the values show the proportion of people
in the respective tax bracket. In the Budget, all the income thresholds were left un-
changed, but the marginal tax rates were reduced, in particular the top marginal rate.
Given the relatively low value of the income threshold above which the top rate applies,
this tax bracket contributes a higher proportion of total income tax revenue than the
other brackets, even though it contains less than ten per cent of taxpayers. This com-
pares with the second tax bracket which contains over half of all taxpayers. The ﬁnal
column of the table reports the revenue elasticity, , in each tax bracket, evaluated














































































Figure 2: Elasticity of Total Tax Revenue wrt Tax Rates: Post-Budget Changes
15is highest in the third tax bracket because the value of ¯ 3 is relatively closer to the
eﬀe c t i v ei n c o m et h r e s h o l d ,∗
3 than for the other brackets. For those in the ﬁrst tax
bracket, the average and marginal tax rates are equal, so that the revenue elasticity is
unity. The Budget change in marginal rates has little eﬀect on the revenue elasticities.
Figures 1 and 2 show the variations in the elasticity, 0
, for each tax bracket, as
the elasticity of taxable income, 1−, increases. As demonstrated above, the value
of each 0
 falls linearly with 1−, but the rate of decrease is noticeably less in
the post-Budget structure. In each case the elasticity, 0
, for the lowest income tax
bracket remains approximately constant. Although the elasticity (¯ ) is highest in the
third tax bracket, the value of 0
 falls faster in the top marginal rate bracket. This
is because the value of (1 − ) is higher for the higher marginal tax rate, along with
the fact that the top-rate bracket contributes a much higher proportion of aggregate
tax revenue.
Some evidence regarding the elasticity of taxable income of New Zealand taxpayers
is reported in Claus et al. (2010). They found that for those in the lower tax brackets,
the estimated elasticities were very small, but for the top marginal tax rate the re-
sponses were substantial. For top-rate taxpayers, the values were mainly in the range
0.5 to 1.2.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has examined the joint role of the elasticity of taxable income (which refers
to the eﬀect on taxable income of a tax rise) and the revenue elasticity (which reﬂects
the eﬀect on revenue of a change in taxable income) in inﬂuencing the revenue eﬀects
of tax rate changes. Traditionally, the revenue elasticity has been the central concept
in examining ﬁscal drag, or obtaining local measures of tax progressivity. But it has an
additional role in the context of the revenue eﬀects of tax changes when incomes respond
to rate changes. This separate eﬀect has not previously been discussed explicitly. The
elasticity of tax revenue with respect to a rate change was examined at both the
individual and aggregate level.
When a single marginal tax rate in a multi-rate income tax structure is changed,
those in the relevant tax bracket adjust their incomes in accordance with the elasticity
of taxable income, and this aﬀe c t st h et a xp a i dv i at h er e v e n u ee l a s t i c i t y .T h e r ei sa l s o
16ar e v e n u ee ﬀect on those individuals who are in higher tax brackets, since marginal
rate changes in lower tax brackets imply a change in their eﬀective income threshold.
But there are no incentive eﬀects on higher-rate taxpayers because only their average
tax rate changes. If there were no incentive eﬀects, an equal proportional change in
all marginal tax rates would produce the same proportional increase in total revenue
— the elasticity is unity. This rapidly falls, at a linear rate, as the elasticity of taxable
income increases.
Illustrations were provided using the New Zealand income tax structures before
and after the 2010 Budget, which reduced all rates while leaving income thresholds
unchanged and, in particular, reduced the top marginal rate substantially. The elas-
ticity of total tax revenue with respect to a single tax rate was found to be particularly
sensitive to the elasticity of taxable income in the top tax bracket. In the pre-Budget
structure, an elasticity of taxable income in excess of 0.6 was found to produce a neg-
ative tax response to an increase in the top marginal rate of 0.38. When this rate is
lower, as in the post-Budget structure, the elasticity of taxable income needs to be over
0.7 before tax revenue is expected to fall in response to an increase in the marginal
rate. These values must be considered as purely illustrative, since they are based on
an approximation to the income distribution, rather than using the precise proportions
of people and income within each tax bracket. However, estimates of the elasticity of
taxable income in the top tax bracket in New Zealand are in the range (with some
estimates in excess of 1) where tax revenue may fall. These results therefore suggest
that further detailed empirical investigation is warranted.
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